The Tangled Web of Knowledge
Is It All Subjective, Political, or Just Human?
Preamble
Ever wondered if what you know is truly "true," or just a cocktail of
personal bias, cultural baggage, and political spin? The question of whether
all knowledge is subjective and political, what deep thinkers make of it, and
whether rational thinking is a pipe dream is a philosophical rabbit hole. It’s
like trying to untangle Christmas lights while debating who gets to call them
"fairy lights." This note weaves together insights from philosophers,
scientists, and modern debates to explore these questions.
1. Is Knowledge Always Subjective and Political?
Knowledge feels like it should be a sturdy bridge to truth,
but is it more like a wobbly rope ladder swayed by human whims and power plays?
Let’s unpack this.
Philosophers have long wrestled with how we know what we
know. Immanuel Kant, the 18th-century brainiac, argued that our minds shape
reality like a cookie cutter shapes dough. “We only know things as they
appear to us, not as they are in themselves,” he wrote in Critique of
Pure Reason (1781). So, even if there’s an objective world out there, our
brains filter it through a subjective lens—kind of like Instagram, but with
less sepia.
Fast forward to the 20th century, Thomas Kuhn shook up
science with his idea of paradigm shifts. “Scientific knowledge isn’t a
steady march toward truth; it’s a series of revolutions driven by social
consensus,” he said in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(1962). Think of scientists as trendy influencers, hyping one theory until a
cooler one comes along, often swayed by cultural or political vibes.
Michel Foucault, the French philosopher with a knack for
spotting power games, took it further. “Knowledge is not made for
understanding; it is made for cutting,” he declared in Discipline and
Punish (1975). For Foucault, what counts as "truth" is decided by
those holding the reins—governments, universities, or even social media
algorithms. Knowledge isn’t just subjective; it’s a political weapon.
Postmodernists like Jean-François Lyotard piled on,
questioning big, universal truths. “I define postmodern as incredulity
toward metanarratives,” Lyotard wrote in The Postmodern Condition
(1979). Translation: there’s no one-size-fits-all truth, just competing stories
shaped by culture and power. It’s like every society has its own Netflix
series, and none are "the real one."
But not all knowledge bends to subjectivity. Mathematics,
for instance, seems like a fortress of objectivity. “2+2=4, whether you’re a
king or a peasant,” as one Twitter user quipped in a May 2025 thread. Yet,
even math isn’t immune to politics—think of how governments fund cryptography
research for military dominance. Natural sciences aim for objectivity through
experiments, but “what gets studied often depends on who’s paying,”
notes a 2024 Nature article on science’s social construction.
Feminist thinkers like Sandra Harding offer a twist. “Ignoring
marginalized perspectives doesn’t make knowledge objective; it makes it
narrower,” she argued in Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (1991). Her
idea of "strong objectivity" suggests that embracing diverse
viewpoints—like those of women or indigenous groups—makes knowledge less
biased, not more. Donna Haraway’s "situated knowledges" echoes this: “All
knowledge is partial, tied to where you stand,” she wrote in 1988. Picture
knowledge as a quilt, stitched from different patches of human experience.
So, is all knowledge subjective and political? Mostly, yes,
but not entirely. Math and logic lean objective, but most knowledge—especially
in science, social studies, or history—is colored by human lenses and power
struggles. It’s less a pure truth and more a group project with some dominant
voices.
2. What Do the Big Brains Say?
If knowledge is a messy human endeavor, what do history’s
deep thinkers make of it? Spoiler: they don’t all agree, and it’s like a
philosophical food fight.
Back in ancient Greece, Plato was all about chasing pure
truth. “We are twice armed if we fight with faith in true knowledge,” he
wrote in The Republic. But he admitted that humans mostly deal in
opinions, not the shiny truths of his ideal "Forms." His student
Aristotle was more grounded, saying, “All men by nature desire to know,”
in Metaphysics. He thought observation and reason could get us close to
truth, but even he knew biases sneak in.
Jump to the 20th century, and John Dewey saw knowledge as a
practical tool, not a holy grail. “Knowledge is an instrument for action,
shaped by human needs,” he wrote in The Quest for Certainty (1929).
Think of knowledge as a Swiss Army knife—useful, but designed for specific
contexts.
Karl Popper, the science philosopher, was a cheerleader for
objectivity. “We can approach truth by testing and falsifying hypotheses,”
he argued in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934). His scientific
method is like a sieve, filtering out subjective nonsense over time—though he
admitted social pressures can clog the holes.
Hannah Arendt, reflecting on truth in dark political times,
warned, “Truth is fragile when power distorts it,” in The Human
Condition (1958). She saw how regimes twist facts, a vibe that resonates in
today’s fake-news era.
Modern thinkers keep the debate spicy. Noam Chomsky, the
linguistics guru, believes objective knowledge is possible but often hijacked. “The
powerful shape what passes for truth,” he’s said in interviews. Jordan
Peterson, love him or hate him, defends rational inquiry but knows it’s a
battlefield. “Truth is the antidote to suffering, but ideology clouds it,”
he lectures. Slavoj Žižek, the wild-card philosopher, sees ideology everywhere.
“What we call objective is just ideology we don’t notice,” he quips in The
Sublime Object of Ideology (1989).
Twitter users in May 2025 echo these divides. One post cites
Foucault to slam “politicized academia,” while another channels Popper,
insisting, “Science isn’t perfect, but it’s the best we’ve got.” It’s
like a Twitter cage match between relativists and truth-defenders, with little
middle ground.
The takeaway? Deep thinkers split into three camps:
optimists (Popper, Habermas) who trust reason to cut through bias; skeptics
(Foucault, Lyotard) who see knowledge as a power game; and pragmatists (Dewey,
Haraway) who say, “Let’s work with the mess and do our best.”
3. Is Rational Thinking and Objective Analysis a Utopian
Dream?
Now, can we really think rationally and analyze objectively,
or is it like chasing a unicorn while riding a unicycle? Let’s explore.
The scientific method is the poster child for rationality. “Test,
observe, repeat—that’s how we build truth,” Popper might say. From Newton’s
gravity to DNA’s double helix, science shows objectivity is possible in
controlled settings. Math and logic are even cleaner—“A theorem doesn’t care
about your feelings,” as an Twitter user snarked in 2025.
Enlightenment thinkers like Descartes were all-in on reason.
“I think, therefore I am,” he famously wrote, betting that clear
thinking could conquer doubt. But modern psychology rains on that parade.
Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011) shows we’re wired for
biases like confirmation bias—our brains are less Spock, more Homer Simpson. “We’re
not rational; we’re rationalizing,” Kahneman might summarize.
Sociologists like Peter Berger add that “reality is
socially constructed,” as he and Thomas Luckmann argued in The Social
Construction of Reality (1966). What we call "objective" often
just means “what most people agree on.” Politics makes it messier—think of how
tobacco companies skewed science or how AI ethics debates today reflect
corporate agendas.
Postmodernists like Jacques Derrida go full skeptic, saying
language itself is slippery. “There is nothing outside the text,” he
wrote, meaning truth is trapped in our subjective words. If even language is
wobbly, good luck with objective analysis.
But there’s hope. Herbert Simon’s “bounded rationality”
suggests we can be rational within limits. “We satisfice—find good-enough
solutions,” he said. Popper’s critical rationalism agrees: “We’re
fallible, but criticism gets us closer to truth.” Feminist thinkers like
Harding flip the script, arguing that “diverse standpoints make objectivity
stronger,” not weaker.
A 2024 Nature piece notes, “Science aims for
objectivity, but funding and culture shape what’s studied.” X debates in
May 2025 highlight this tension—one user praises SpaceX’s engineering as “pure
rationality,” while another retorts, “It’s just capitalism flexing in
space.”
So, is rationality utopian? Not exactly. It’s achievable in
narrow fields like math or physics, tougher in social sciences or politics,
where biases and power loom large. It’s less a utopia and more a gym
workout—hard, but doable with discipline and diverse perspectives.
4. Why It Matters: Broader Implications
This isn’t just academic navel-gazing; it shapes our world.
Epistemologically, it’s about whether we trust firm truths or see knowledge as
a web of beliefs. Politically, “who controls knowledge controls power,”
as Foucault might remind us—think of colonial "science" justifying
empire or today’s climate debates. Ethically, inclusive knowledge (e.g.,
indigenous voices) fights bias and promotes justice. Practically, we rely on
“good-enough” knowledge daily—your GPS works, even if it’s not philosophically
pure.
Conclusion
Knowledge is a human creation, and like any homemade dish, it’s flavored by
who’s in the kitchen. It’s often subjective and political, shaped by our minds,
cultures, and power structures, but not always—math and science offer glimpses
of objectivity, like stars through a cloudy sky. Deep thinkers, from Plato to
Žižek, range from truth-chasers to power-skeptics, with pragmatists urging us
to make the best of the mess. Rationality isn’t a utopia but a hard-won skill,
strongest when we embrace diverse views and question our biases. So, next time
you “know” something, ask: Whose truth is this, and what’s their agenda?
Keep thinking critically—it’s the closest we get to untangling the Christmas
lights of knowledge.
References
- Kant,
I. (1781). Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press.
- Kuhn,
T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of
Chicago Press.
- Foucault,
M. (1975). Discipline and Punish. Vintage Books.
- Lyotard,
J.-F. (1979). The Postmodern Condition. University of Minnesota
Press.
- Harding,
S. (1991). Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Cornell University
Press.
- Haraway,
D. (1988). Situated Knowledges. Feminist Studies.
- Dewey,
J. (1929). The Quest for Certainty. Minton, Balch & Company.
- Popper,
K. (1934). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Routledge.
- Arendt,
H. (1958). The Human Condition. University of Chicago Press.
- Žižek,
S. (1989). The Sublime Object of Ideology. Verso.
- Berger,
P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality.
Anchor Books.
- Kahneman,
D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2023). Feminist Epistemology.
- Nature
(2024). The Social Construction of Science.
- Twitter
Posts (May 2025). Various threads on knowledge, objectivity, and science.
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