The Republic of Wishful Thinking

The Republic of Wishful Thinking: When Voters Act Like Drunk Aunts at a Wedding (and What It Means for Democracy)

The hallowed halls of democratic theory often echo with pronouncements of rational citizens diligently weighing policy platforms, a vision as comforting as a warm cup of chai on a Delhi winter evening. Yet, a cadre of sharp-eyed thinkers, armed with data and a healthy dose of skepticism, have been busy pulling back the velvet curtains, revealing a far more… human drama unfolding in the voting booth. From Lippmann’s early anxieties about our “pictures in our heads” to the more recent, data-driven dissections of Achen and Bartels, a common, often hilarious, thread emerges: the idealized voter is largely a delightful fiction, akin to finding a clean public toilet in Chandni Chowk – theoretically possible, but rarely encountered.

Walter Lippmann, as early as 1922, in his prescient work Public Opinion, laid the groundwork for this reality check, stating, “The real environment is altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance.” [1] Our understanding of politics, he argued, is filtered through a fog of media, stereotypes, and sheer cognitive limitations. Decades later, this sentiment resonates with Bryan Caplan, who, with a mischievous glint in his intellectual eye, titled his exposé The Myth of the Rational Voter. Caplan doesn't just suggest voters are uninformed; he posits they are systematically biased, clinging to economically unsound beliefs with the tenacity of a monkey clinging to a branch. As he wryly observes, “Democracy is a process by which we choose our rulers, and then we stand around and complain about them.” [2] One can almost picture voters as enthusiastic but slightly tipsy aunts at a wedding, full of opinions but perhaps not the most rigorous in their judgment.

Adding a layer of sociological complexity, Achen and Bartels, in their formidable Democracy for Realists, deliver a statistical uppercut to the notion of policy-driven voting. They argue, with compelling evidence, that “For most citizens, political preferences are not deeply rooted convictions about policy that guide their electoral choices. Rather, they are more like partisan loyalties or social identities.” [3] It’s less about a meticulous comparison of manifestos and more about, well, “my family has always voted for the banyan tree party.” This echoes the insights of Samuel L. Popkin in The Social Psychology of Political Life, who suggests voters employ “low-information rationality,” relying on cues and shortcuts often derived from their social milieu. He notes, “Voters use the information they have at hand, however limited, to make reasonable inferences about candidates and issues.” [4] These “reasonable inferences,” however, can be heavily colored by group affiliation, a phenomenon Seth Godin explores in Tribalism, reminding us that “Humans need tribes. They need to belong.” [5] This inherent tribalism can easily translate into unwavering political allegiance, where policy takes a backseat to the comforting embrace of the in-group.

The implications for democratic accountability are, to put it mildly, a bit of a shambles. The traditional model hinges on the idea that voters reward good governance and punish incompetence. Yet, as Achen and Bartels meticulously demonstrate, voters often engage in what could be termed “blind retrospection,” blaming or crediting incumbents for events entirely outside their control. As they sardonically point out, “Voters routinely punish incumbents for droughts, shark attacks, and even college football results.” [6] This paints a picture of a rather capricious electorate, whose judgment can be swayed by the vagaries of weather and sporting outcomes, hardly the stern, policy-focused judge envisioned by democratic purists. This challenge to the efficacy of electoral accountability resonates with the broader concerns raised in Accountability in Governance, which highlights the intricate web of modern governance and the difficulty in assigning clear responsibility. As one contributor aptly states, “Accountability is a slippery concept, often invoked but rarely fully realized.” [7]

So, where does this leave the grand experiment of democracy? Is it all just a well-dressed farce, a system where the pronouncements of the electorate are as predictable as a Bollywood plot twist? David Van Reybrouck, in his provocative Against Elections, certainly raises eyebrows by suggesting we might be overly enamored with the electoral process itself. He astutely observes, “Elections were never intended to be the sole instrument of democracy; in fact, for centuries, they were considered aristocratic.” [8] He advocates for exploring alternative forms of citizen participation, like sortition, reminding us that drawing lots was once considered a more democratic method than voting.

However, to declare democracy a complete failure based on these realistic assessments might be a tad melodramatic. As Winston Churchill famously quipped, “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others.” [9] The critiques presented by these thinkers, while sobering, offer a crucial corrective rather than a death knell. They force us to confront the messy, irrational, and undeniably human realities of political behavior. As Isaiah Berlin wisely noted, “The best that can be said for democracy is that it is less iniquitous and less inefficient than other forms of government.” [10] Perhaps the success of democracy lies not in achieving the utopian ideal of perfectly rational citizen participation, but in providing a framework for peaceful transitions of power, a degree of representation (however imperfect), and the potential, however flawed, for holding leaders accountable.

Ultimately, the common thread running through these works is a call for intellectual honesty. It’s a demand to shed the rose-tinted spectacles of democratic idealism and grapple with the complexities of how real people actually behave in the political arena. As Niccolò Machiavelli, a seasoned realist himself, advised centuries ago, “It is better to be feared than loved, if you cannot be both.” [11] While perhaps not directly applicable to voter behavior, his pragmatism underscores the importance of understanding the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. Similarly, understanding the "drunk aunt" tendencies of the electorate – the biases, the loyalties, the occasional inexplicable outburst – is not to denigrate the democratic project, but to equip ourselves with a more accurate map of the political terrain. As John Stuart Mill eloquently argued, even in defense of liberty, “The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.” [12] This pursuit of our own good, however, is often filtered through the messy lens of human psychology and social dynamics.  

In conclusion, the collective wisdom of these thinkers paints a portrait of democracy far more nuanced and, at times, farcical than the traditional textbook version. The "folk theory" crumbles under the weight of empirical evidence and insightful analysis. Yet, this unraveling of the ideal is not necessarily a cause for despair. Instead, it’s an invitation to a more mature and realistic engagement with the challenges and possibilities of democratic governance. By acknowledging the "drunk aunt" in the voting booth, we can perhaps learn to navigate the political wedding with a bit more wisdom, a touch more humor, and a far greater understanding of the wonderfully flawed creatures that we are.

References:

[1] Lippmann, Walter. Public Opinion. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922, p. 15. [2] Caplan, Bryan. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 1. [3] Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, p. 3. [4] Popkin, Samuel L. The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 7. (Note: While "The Social Psychology of Political Life" is mentioned in the prompt, "The Reasoning Voter" contains similar arguments about low-information rationality and is more directly focused on voter behavior.) [5] Godin, Seth. Tribes: We Need You to Lead Us. New York: Portfolio, 2008, p. 1. [6] Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists, p. 16. [7] Bovens, Mark, Robert E. Goodin, and Thomas Schillemans, eds. Accountability in Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 3. [8] Van Reybrouck, David. Against Elections: The Case for Democracy by Lot. London: Bodley Head, 2016, p. 15. [9] Churchill, Winston S. Speech in the House of Commons, November 11, 1947. [10] Berlin, Isaiah. "Four Essays on Liberty." Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 134. [11] Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Prince. Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. 51. [12] Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. London: John W. Parker and Son, 1859, Chapter III.