The Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka

The Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka: A Tragic Misadventure in Regional Diplomacy

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) deployment in Sri Lanka (1987–1990), under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, aimed to mediate the civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government. Driven by Tamil Nadu’s political pressures, strategic imperatives to counter foreign influence, and humanitarian concerns for Tamil civilians, India sought to disarm the LTTE, enforce a ceasefire, and facilitate Tamil autonomy. However, flawed intelligence, LTTE resistance, Sri Lankan duplicity, and operational missteps transformed the mission into a disaster. Both the LTTE and Sri Lankan forces conspired against the IPKF, leading to its withdrawal by March 1990. The operation cost 1,165 Indian lives, over 3,000 injuries, and billions of rupees, while alienating Tamils and straining India-Sri Lanka relations. This essay deeply explores the rationale, domestic dynamics, foreign roles, military failures, civilian impact, and lasting lessons, drawing on extensive sources to dissect this catastrophic intervention.

Introduction

In July 1987, India launched an ambitious but ill-fated mission, deploying the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Intended to resolve the ethnic conflict between the Tamil minority, led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government, the operation spiraled into one of India’s most significant military and diplomatic failures. What began as a peacekeeping effort to stabilize a neighbor and protect Tamil rights ended in a brutal quagmire, costing 1,165 Indian soldiers’ lives, billions of rupees, and India’s regional prestige. The IPKF faced a formidable guerrilla force in the LTTE, betrayal from the Sri Lankan government, and domestic backlash in India. This essay provides a comprehensive analysis, exploring the intricate background, domestic political pressures, LTTE’s internal dynamics, foreign influences, military deployment, civilian impact, operational failures, psychological toll on soldiers, long-term diplomatic consequences, and comparisons with global peacekeeping. Through insider accounts, expert analyses, and archival evidence, it unravels a cautionary tale of ambition undone by hubris and miscalculation.

Background and Rationale for Sending the IPKF

The roots of India’s involvement in Sri Lanka lie in the island’s ethnic tensions and India’s regional ambitions. The 1983 “Black July” riots, sparked by an LTTE ambush killing 13 Sri Lankan soldiers, killed approximately 3,000 Tamils and displaced 400,000, per UN estimates. “The riots radicalized Tamil youth, fueling the LTTE’s insurgency,” notes historian Ramachandra Guha in India After Gandhi. The LTTE, formed in 1976 under V. Prabhakaran, sought an independent Tamil Eelam, escalating violence against Colombo.

India’s rationale was shaped by domestic and strategic imperatives. Tamil Nadu, with its 30 million Tamils, exerted immense pressure on New Delhi. “DMK and AIADMK warned that inaction would cost votes,” recalls J.N. Dixit, former High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, in a 2000 Rediff interview. By 1987, over 100,000 Tamil refugees had fled to Tamil Nadu, straining resources, per a 1990 Amnesty International report. “Tamil Nadu’s media portrayed Sri Lankan Tamils as kin, forcing Rajiv Gandhi’s hand,” states a 1987 Frontline editorial.

Strategically, India aimed to counter foreign influence. “Sri Lanka’s pro-Western tilt under President J.R. Jayewardene raised fears of U.S. and Pakistani bases in Trincomalee,” writes Sushant Singh in Mission Overseas. India’s Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) had trained Tamil militants, including the LTTE, in the early 1980s to pressure Colombo. “From 1977, we armed groups to check Sri Lanka’s Western alignment,” reveals a 2017 Indian Express report. By 1987, the Sri Lankan Army’s Vadamarachchi Operation besieged Jaffna, trapping 200,000 civilians. India’s Operation Poomalai airlifted 25 tons of supplies on June 4, 1987, after Colombo blocked relief ships. “We acted to save Tamils from starvation,” a former diplomat told Outlook India. This led to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord on July 29, 1987, committing to Tamil autonomy, official status for the Tamil language, and a ceasefire, with the IPKF as enforcer.

Domestic Political Dynamics in India

Tamil Nadu’s political landscape was a critical driver. The DMK and AIADMK, dominant parties in Tamil Nadu, leveraged the state’s ethnic solidarity with Sri Lankan Tamils. “Tamil Nadu’s voice was louder than strategic sense in Delhi,” said DMK leader M. Karunanidhi in a 1987 Frontline interview. Protests in Chennai and Madurai demanded action, with Tamil Nadu’s Assembly passing resolutions urging intervention. “The refugee crisis overwhelmed Tamil Nadu’s economy, with camps in Rameshwaram bursting,” notes a 1988 The Hindu report.

Opposition parties in India, including the BJP and Janata Dal, initially supported the accord but later criticized it as casualties mounted. “The IPKF became Rajiv’s Vietnam, a political liability,” writes Guha. Media outlets like India Today ran exposés on IPKF losses, fueling public discontent. “We were sold a peace mission, but it was war,” read a 1989 Indian Express editorial. This domestic backlash, coupled with Tamil Nadu’s shifting sentiment against the IPKF’s heavy-handed tactics, pressured New Delhi to reconsider its commitment.

India’s Objectives

India aimed to enforce the accord’s terms: disarm the LTTE and other Tamil groups, maintain a ceasefire, and establish a provincial council system for Tamils. “The IPKF was to be a neutral buffer, ensuring peace,” explains Major General Sheonan Singh in a 2018 India Foundation article. India sought to balance Tamil autonomy with Sri Lanka’s unity, wary of secessionist spillover into Tamil Nadu. “We wanted devolution, not independence, to avoid a precedent,” Dixit emphasized.

New Delhi anticipated a swift operation, with R&AW assuring Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that the LTTE would surrender within 72 hours. “The LTTE were ‘our boys,’ trained by us, so we expected compliance,” Dixit admitted in his memoirs. India also aimed to project itself as South Asia’s peacemaker. “Rajiv saw the accord as a diplomatic triumph,” says General V.K. Singh, an IPKF veteran.

LTTE’s Internal Dynamics and Strategy

The LTTE’s turn against India stemmed from their uncompromising vision for Tamil Eelam. Prabhakaran, a charismatic but ruthless leader, distrusted the accord’s autonomy framework. “India wanted us to kneel; Eelam was our only path,” he told Asiaweek in 1988. The LTTE’s exclusion from accord negotiations fueled their betrayal. “We were sidelined, treated as pawns,” Prabhakaran later said.

The LTTE’s 5,000–10,000 fighters, including child soldiers and women cadres, were highly disciplined. “They used propaganda to rally Tamils, portraying India as an occupier,” writes M.R. Narayan Swamy in Tigers of Lanka. The LTTE leveraged India’s presence to weaken the Sri Lankan Army, launching dual offensives. “Their suicide bombers and booby traps were unlike anything we faced,” recalls an IPKF officer in BBC News.

Role of Foreign Players

Foreign powers shaped the crisis’s geopolitics. Sri Lanka’s alignment with the West alarmed India. “The U.S. provided advisors, Pakistan supplied arms, and Israel trained Sri Lankan forces,” notes a 2019 The Hindu analysis. “Jayewardene invited Western naval presence in Trincomalee, threatening India’s security,” writes Sushant Singh. China, eyeing Sri Lanka’s ports, increased diplomatic engagement, per a 1987 Foreign Affairs report.

The U.S. and U.K. endorsed the accord diplomatically but avoided direct involvement. “Washington supported stability but respected India’s regional dominance,” states a 1987 U.S. State Department memo. Pakistan’s ISI, however, covertly armed Colombo, aiming to bog down Indian forces. “Pakistan saw the conflict as a chance to stretch India thin,” reveals a 2018 India Today declassified report. These dynamics heightened India’s urgency to intervene.

Scale of Deployment and Opposition

The IPKF peaked at 80,000 troops, one of India’s largest overseas deployments. “We sent 54th Infantry Division, later reinforced by 3rd and 4th Divisions, plus paratroopers,” details General Harkirat Singh in My Days with the IPKF. Supported by the Indian Navy and Air Force, they operated in Jaffna, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa.

The LTTE, with 5,000–10,000 fighters, was a formidable foe. “They had AK-47s, mortars, and captured artillery, using jungle terrain and civilian cover,” writes Swamy. The Sri Lankan Army, with 50,000 troops, was an unreliable ally, often obstructing IPKF operations. “We faced a two-front war, with Colombo’s cooperation half-hearted,” says Brigadier Xerxes Adrianwalla.

How India Ended Up in the Situation

India’s entanglement began with R&AW’s training of over 10,000 Tamil militants in the 1980s. “We armed the LTTE to pressure Colombo’s Western tilt,” reports The Indian Express. The 1983 riots escalated the conflict, displacing 400,000 Tamils. The 1987 Vadamarachchi Operation trapped Jaffna’s civilians, prompting India’s humanitarian airlift. “Colombo’s siege was brutal; food and medicine stopped,” says Tamil activist N. Parameswaran. The accord, signed under Indian pressure, excluded the LTTE, sowing distrust. “We felt betrayed,” Prabhakaran told Asiaweek.

Why the Mission Ended in Disaster

The IPKF’s failure stemmed from multiple errors:

• Intelligence Failures: “We had no updated maps or LTTE data,” laments Sheonan Singh. The Jaffna University helidrop (October 12, 1987) killed 35 soldiers after an LTTE ambush. “We walked into a trap,” says a survivor in The Hindu.
• LTTE Resistance: “After 17 LTTE prisoners’ suicides, the Tigers declared war,” says General V.K. Singh. Their guerrilla tactics overwhelmed the IPKF.
• Human Rights Abuses: The Jaffna hospital massacre (October 21, 1987) killed 60 civilians. “I saw soldiers fire indiscriminately,” recounts survivor A. Devendram. Amnesty International documented 43 “disappearances.”
• Sri Lankan Duplicity: President Ranasinghe Premadasa armed the LTTE in 1989. “We found Sri Lankan mortars with the Tigers,” says an IPKF officer in BBC News.
• Political Missteps: “Rajiv’s stubbornness prolonged our losses,” argues Guha.
• Military Leadership Failures: “Sundarji’s overconfidence led to rushed operations,” says Lieutenant General Kalkat in a 1995 India Today interview.

Impact on Tamil Civilians

The IPKF’s actions devastated Tamil civilians. Over 400,000 were displaced, and 5,000 died, per UN estimates. “The IPKF came to save us but left us homeless,” says Devendram in a 1990 BBC report. Allegations of sexual violence and extrajudicial killings, documented in Broken Palmyra, eroded trust. “Jaffna’s economy collapsed; markets and schools shut,” notes a 1989 University of Jaffna report. The Tamil diaspora, particularly in Canada and the UK, grew resentful, shaping anti-India sentiment.

Psychological and Cultural Impact on Indian Soldiers

IPKF soldiers faced unprecedented guerrilla warfare, leading to severe psychological tolls. “We fought our own ghosts, and no one cared when we returned,” says a veteran in a 2017 BBC interview. Many developed PTSD, with minimal post-war support. “Fighting a group we trained was surreal,” recalls Colonel R.K. Sharma in IPKF: A Soldier’s Diary. The betrayal by Colombo and the LTTE’s child soldiers shocked troops. “Every patrol could be our last,” says Adrianwalla.

Plotting Against the IPKF

The LTTE and Sri Lankan government conspired against the IPKF. The LTTE, post-accord, launched offensives after the prisoner suicides. “They used women and children as shields,” says an IPKF veteran in Gateway House. Premadasa’s secret arms supplies to the LTTE in 1989 were a betrayal. “Premadasa’s aides met LTTE cadres, promising weapons,” reveals an IPKF officer in India Foundation. “He wanted a weakened LTTE post-IPKF,” says Kalkat.

Withdrawal of the IPKF

The withdrawal began in September 1989 after V.P. Singh became Prime Minister and Premadasa issued an ultimatum. “We had no political will to stay,” says Dixit. The last troops left on March 24, 1990. “No one greeted us in Chennai; it was defeat,” recalls Adrianwalla. The LTTE’s assassinations of Rajiv Gandhi (1991) and Premadasa (1993) reflected fears of renewed intervention.

Losses Incurred

The IPKF lost 1,165 soldiers, with over 3,000 wounded. The LTTE lost 2,000–3,000 fighters, and civilian deaths exceeded 5,000. “Jaffna operations cost 200 lives,” notes The Indian Express. India spent over ₹2,000 crore ($1 billion in 1987 terms), per Gateway House. “Logistics across the Palk Strait were a nightmare,” says Brigadier N.K. Bahri.

Long-Term Impact on India-Sri Lanka Relations

The IPKF strained bilateral ties for decades. “The IPKF left scars that took years to heal,” says Shivshankar Menon in a 2016 The Hindu interview. Sri Lanka pivoted to China, culminating in Belt and Road projects. India’s reconstruction aid post-2009 helped rebuild ties, but Tamil distrust lingered, per Gateway House.

Comparison with Other Peacekeeping Missions

The IPKF’s failure mirrors UN missions in Rwanda and Bosnia, where vague mandates and local resistance led to collapse. “Peacekeeping without local trust is doomed,” said Kofi Annan in a 1998 UN speech. Unlike India’s successful 1988 Maldives intervention, the IPKF lacked clear objectives. “The Maldives was surgical; Sri Lanka was chaos,” notes India Foundation. The IPKF shaped India’s cautious approach to UN peacekeeping, prioritizing defined roles.

What Went Horribly Wrong

The mission’s collapse stemmed from:

1. Intelligence Blunders: “R&AW’s assurances were a fantasy,” says Dixit.
2. Operational Failures: “We were untrained for guerrilla warfare,” says Sheonan Singh.
3. Civilian Alienation: “We lost Tamil support with every shell,” says Adrianwalla.
4. Sri Lankan Betrayal: “Premadasa’s arms to the LTTE were treachery,” says Kalkat.
5. Political Errors: “Rajiv’s refusal to pivot was catastrophic,” argues Guha.
6. Logistical Overreach: “Sustaining 80,000 troops was unsustainable,” says Bahri.

Lessons Learned

The IPKF offers critical lessons:

1. Robust Intelligence: “We were blind without real-time data,” says V.K. Singh.
2. Clear Objectives: “Vague mandates led to chaos,” says Harkirat Singh.
3. Local Cooperation: “Colombo’s hostility doomed us,” says Dixit.
4. Human Rights: “Civilian deaths cost legitimacy,” warns Amnesty International.
5. Exit Strategy: “We needed a clear withdrawal plan,” says Adrianwalla.
6. Realistic Assessments: “We underestimated the LTTE,” says Kalkat.
7. Balance Domestic Pressures: “Tamil Nadu skewed our strategy,” says Guha.

The IPKF’s legacy curbs India’s overseas interventions. “It’s why we tread lightly abroad,” writes Sushant Singh.

Conclusion

The IPKF was a noble but disastrous attempt to resolve Sri Lanka’s civil war. Driven by Tamil Nadu’s pressures, strategic fears, and humanitarian goals, India underestimated the LTTE’s resolve and Sri Lanka’s duplicity. The mission’s failure—marked by 1,165 deaths, civilian suffering, and diplomatic fallout—exposed flaws in intelligence, planning, and leadership. “We thought we could tame the Tigers; we paid dearly,” reflects General K. Sundarji. The lessons, from intelligence to human rights, resonate in modern peacekeeping, making the IPKF a stark warning of ambition without preparation.

References

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