The Imperative of Sea Power in a Multipolar Age: Mahan, Corbett, and the Evolving Geostrategic Contest Between the United States and China
The
Imperative of Sea Power in a Multipolar Age: Mahan, Corbett, and the Evolving
Geostrategic Contest Between the United States and China
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s doctrine—that
command of the sea, secured through a decisive fleet battle and sustained by
robust institutional structures, determines national greatness—provides a
foundational lens for understanding contemporary naval and strategic
competition. Mahan posited that true maritime dominance requires not merely
material strength but a national character and governmental framework conducive
to sustained overseas projection, a criterion which he argued disqualified
continental powers like China due to their inward focus and preoccupation with
internal security. Julian Corbett tempered this view, emphasizing that control
of the sea often manifests as limited, graduated command over maritime
communications through distributed operations rather than absolute victory in a
climactic battle. Historical examples, from Trafalgar’s decisive annihilation
to the indecisive yet strategically conclusive Battle of Jutland, illustrate
the complementary nature of these paradigms: fleet destruction establishes
primacy, while flexible campaigns maintain it.
In the modern context, this intellectual framework
illuminates the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, where
the U.S. pursues a hybrid strategy of concentrated naval deterrence and
dispersed allied operations to secure maritime communications in the Western
Pacific. China, despite its rapid naval expansion to over 370 ships, confronts
Mahanian institutional limitations, lacking the global basing network and
merchant marine capacity for sustained power projection beyond the First Island
Chain. The U.S. response integrates Mahan’s emphasis on fleet readiness with
Corbett’s distributed approach, leveraging alliances to impose the tyranny of
distance on a geographically constrained adversary. Within this contest, India
emerges as a pivotal, though asymmetrically dependent, partner. The U.S.-India
strategic partnership, while deepening through defense frameworks, technology
transfers, and Quad cooperation, is characterized by a transactional
carrot-and-stick dynamic, where economic leverage—exemplified by selective
tariffs—compels alignment without full trust. Over the next decade, India’s
capacity to achieve greater parity hinges on internal reforms fostering
self-reliance, thereby transforming its role from useful counterweight to
indispensable pole in a multipolar order.
The strategic interplay of these dynamics underscores a
broader truth: in an era where maritime supremacy remains the arbiter of global
influence, the ability to secure sea lines of communication—whether through
decisive combat, distributed operations, or alliance networks—will determine
the balance of power. As naval capabilities evolve with unmanned systems and
hypersonic weapons, the principles articulated by Mahan and Corbett retain
their relevance, conditioning the prospects for sustained command of the sea.
The Intellectual Foundations: Mahan and Corbett
At the heart of naval strategy lies Mahan’s uncompromising
assertion that “the element of war in which command of the sea is contested is
a decisive battle between the main fleets of the opposing powers.” For Mahan,
command of the sea is absolute and exclusive: partial or shared control is
illusory, and only the annihilation of an adversary’s primary battle
fleet—through a single, concentrated engagement—can secure enduring maritime
supremacy. This doctrine, drawn from the fleet actions of the sailing era, such
as Trafalgar, where Nelson’s destruction of the Franco-Spanish navy ensured
British hegemony for over a century, privileges the maintenance of a
homogeneous battle fleet over dispersed operations. Mahan identified six
principal elements underpinning sea power—geographical position, physical
conformation, extent of territory, population, national character, and
government—but stressed that institutional characteristics were paramount. A
nation lacking a consistent maritime policy and a populace inclined toward
commercial and exploratory enterprise could possess the material prerequisites
for naval power yet fail to wield it effectively.
Corbett offered a corrective to this fleet-centric
worldview. Command of the sea, he argued, is “never absolute but always partial
and temporary, and it is exercised in degrees which vary with the nature of the
operations.” Corbett shifted the focus from the battle fleet to the protection
and interdiction of maritime communications, the sinews of commerce and
military operations. Minor forces—cruisers, submarines, and convoys—play
indispensable roles in securing or denying sea lanes, and decisive battles, while
preferable, are neither always feasible nor sufficient. The Battle of Jutland
exemplifies this distinction: despite failing to destroy the German High Seas
Fleet, the Royal Navy retained effective control of the North Sea, as the enemy
fleet remained bottled up in port, unable to contest Britain’s maritime
communications. Similarly, the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was
achieved not through a decisive fleet engagement but through the distributed
application of convoy protection, anti-submarine warfare, and air cover.
These complementary perspectives—Mahan’s emphasis on the
decisive fleet action as the ultimate arbiter of command, and Corbett’s focus
on the operational reality of securing maritime communications—frame the
contemporary naval strategies of the great powers. Neither theorist’s framework
operates in isolation; effective maritime strategy integrates the capacity for
decisive combat with the flexibility to maintain control through distributed
means.
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A comparison between Alfred
Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett, the two most influential naval strategic
thinkers of the early twentieth century:
Key Differences in Strategic
Philosophy The fundamental divergence
between Mahan and Corbett lies in their conceptions of what constitutes
victory in naval warfare. Mahan viewed naval conflict as fundamentally a
contest between battle fleets, where victory is determined by the destruction
of the enemy’s primary naval force in a decisive engagement. This perspective
emphasizes concentration, culminating in a climactic fleet battle. Corbett, by contrast, regarded
naval strategy as primarily concerned with controlling maritime
communications—the networks of sea routes that sustain trade and military
operations. He argued that command of the sea is not an absolute condition
but a practical ability to use the sea for one’s own purposes while denying
it to the enemy. This broader conception allows for a variety of methods to
achieve maritime supremacy, including but not limited to fleet actions. Reconciling the Two Perspectives While their approaches appear
antithetical, the theories are not entirely incompatible. Corbett explicitly
acknowledged the importance of the decisive battle when circumstances permit,
stating that it "remains the only sure method of gaining command."
However, he maintained that such opportunities are rare and that naval
strategy must account for the more common situation where decisive action is
either unattainable or unnecessary. Thus, Mahan provides the
doctrinal foundation for how command of the sea is ultimately
established—through the destruction of the enemy fleet—while Corbett provides
the operational framework for conducting naval campaigns when such decisive
conditions are absent. Modern naval strategy typically incorporates elements
of both thinkers: recognizing the enduring importance of maintaining a fleet
capable of defeating the enemy’s main naval force while conducting
distributed operations to secure maritime communications and support broader
military objectives. |
The Contemporary Maritime Contest: The United States and
China
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China
unfolds within this intellectual framework, with each power navigating the
imperatives of sea control in a theater defined by the Western Pacific’s island
chains. China’s naval expansion—now comprising over 370 ships, including three
aircraft carriers and a growing arsenal of anti-ship ballistic
missiles—represents the most significant challenge to American maritime
supremacy since the Cold War. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has
prioritized anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, creating a formidable
defensive bastion within the First Island Chain. Yet, as Mahan observed,
institutional and structural constraints limit China’s ability to translate
this quantitative advantage into global sea power. China’s navy, while
numerically superior, lacks the network of secure overseas bases, robust
auxiliary fleet, and experienced blue-water operations necessary to sustain
power projection beyond its near seas. Its dependence on imported energy and
raw materials, transiting through chokepoints such as the Malacca Strait,
renders its maritime communications inherently vulnerable.
The United States counters this challenge with a strategy
that blends Mahanian fleet concentration with Corbett’s distributed operations.
The Navy’s 2027 Navigation Plan aims to achieve 80 percent surge readiness,
preserving a battle fleet capable of defeating the PLAN in a decisive
engagement, while emphasizing dispersed basing—particularly in the
Philippines—and unmanned systems to complicate China’s A2/AD calculus. The
concept of a “1,000-ship navy,” incorporating allied contributions from Japan,
Australia, and others, exemplifies Corbett’s emphasis on securing maritime
communications through distributed force. As naval analyst Bryan Clark notes,
“The U.S. cannot afford to fight the Chinese fleet on its terms within the
first island chain. Distributed maritime operations allow for a more survivable
and effective posture.” However, persistent challenges—maintenance backlogs,
industrial base constraints, and the PLAN’s shipbuilding capacity, which dwarfs
that of the United States—underscore the precariousness of sustained command.
China’s institutional limitations, as Mahan would predict,
further constrain its maritime ambitions. The centralized nature of the Chinese
Communist Party, while enabling rapid mobilization, prioritizes internal
stability and continental defense over the commercial and exploratory ethos
Mahan deemed essential for sea power. As historian Toshi Yoshihara observes,
“China’s maritime strategy remains tethered to the imperatives of coastal
defense and regional denial rather than global power projection.” This dynamic
suggests that while China poses a formidable near-seas challenge, its ability
to contest American command of the open ocean remains limited by structural
factors.
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US Strategy in Trade Wars and
Naval Posture (as of November 2025) The United States, under
President Donald Trump's second administration, is pursuing an aggressive yet
pragmatic approach to countering China's economic and military rise. This
dual-track strategy blends economic coercion through tariffs and export controls
with enhanced naval deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, emphasizing alliances to
offset China's quantitative advantages. The overarching goal is to
"rebalance" trade deficits, protect critical supply chains, and
maintain freedom of navigation, while avoiding direct kinetic conflict.
However, recent de-escalations suggest a recognition that full decoupling is
neither feasible nor desirable, shifting toward managed competition. Trade Wars: Escalation Followed
by Tactical Truces The US-China trade war,
reignited in early 2025, has been marked by tit-for-tat tariffs, export
restrictions on critical minerals, and semiconductor scrutiny. Key
developments include: US Actions: In February 2025, Trump
invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose a
10% tariff on all Chinese imports, citing fentanyl trafficking as a national
emergency. This escalated to 20% by March, with peaks at 125% on select goods.
Additional measures targeted maritime logistics, including port fees on
Chinese-built vessels (up to $3.5 million per ship for major carriers like
COSCO), aiming to revive US shipbuilding. The administration also suspended
Section 301 tariffs on certain sectors (e.g., shipbuilding) for one year
starting November 10, 2025, to facilitate negotiations. China's Retaliation: Beijing responded with 15%
tariffs on US agricultural goods (e.g., soybeans, corn) in March, widened
rare earth export controls in October (covering five more elements), and
designated US firms as "unreliable entities." China also halted
direct imports of US commodities like beef and LNG through bureaucratic
barriers. Recent De-Escalation: A pivotal Trump-Xi summit in
Busan, South Korea (October 30, 2025), led to a 90-day truce extension,
suspending most retaliatory measures. China resumed US soybean purchases (12
million metric tons by end-2025, 25 million annually through 2028) and lifted
bans on gallium/germanium exports (though under license). The US reduced
fentanyl-related tariffs from 20% to 10% and overall rates from 57% to 47%.
This "uneasy phase" reflects mutual vulnerabilities: China's
economy grew at a sluggish 4.8% in Q3 2025 amid trade strains, while US
households face $1,200 annual tariff costs. The strategy prioritizes
"friend-shoring" supply chains to allies like India, Vietnam, and
Mexico, but experts note it's costly and incomplete—China's global exports
surged 5.2% in 2025 despite tariffs, redirecting to non-US markets. On X,
analysts highlight US procedural gridlock as a self-inflicted wound,
contrasting China's state-directed efficiency in semiconductors and
shipbuilding. Naval Strategies: Deterrence
Through Alliances and Dispersion US naval posture focuses on
countering China's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the
"near seas" (South China Sea, Taiwan Strait), blending Mahan-esque
fleet concentration with Corbett's distributed operations. The Pentagon's
2027 Navigation Plan aims for 80% surge readiness by then, targeting Xi
Jinping's reported Taiwan invasion timeline.
The US exploits the Philippine
archipelago as a "natural barrier" to contain China's navy within
the First Island Chain, while integrating unmanned drones for distributed
lethality. X discussions emphasize US alliances as a "force multiplier,"
with Japan and Australia bolstering deterrence. Is China a Real Challenger? Yes, unequivocally—China is the
US's most formidable peer competitor in a century, outpacing in key metrics
despite qualitative gaps. Quantitative Edge: China's navy (370+ ships)
surpasses the US (296), with 200x shipbuilding capacity; it produces 53% of
global tonnage vs. US's 0.1%. By 2030, PLAN could field 5–10 carriers vs.
US's 11. Economically, China's manufacturing is 2x the US; it leads in EVs, patents,
and hypersonics. Qualitative Progress: Advances like the Fujian
carrier (EMALS catapults) and KJ-600 AEW aircraft close gaps; PLA's missile
stocks and A2/AD systems threaten US carriers. However, US advantages persist
in combat experience, global basing, and tech integration (e.g., F-35s, B-21s). Limitations: China's navy excels in near
seas but lacks blue-water sustainment; vulnerabilities include energy import
dependence (30% of world trade via chokepoints) and demographic/economic
strains (aging population, 4.8% growth). As one X analyst notes, "China's
strength is in the 1st island chain; thereafter, the tyranny of distance saps
its strength." In wargames, China inflicts
heavy losses but struggles with sustained operations; US alliances tip the
balance. Likely Trajectory Over the Next
10 Years (2026–2035) Projections point to intensified
managed competition, with risks of escalation but no inevitable war. A
"détente-like" stabilization could emerge by 2030, echoing
US-Soviet 1970s dynamics, as mutual vulnerabilities (e.g., trade
interdependence) enforce restraint.
Overall, deterrence holds if US
scales alliances and tech (e.g., AI, hypersonics), but failure risks a
"decade of maximum danger" (2027–2035) with catastrophic
costs—economic collapse, millions in casualties. As one X post warns,
"No one wants war, but the CCP seems pretty determined." Success
hinges on US domestic reforms to match China's state capitalism. |
India’s Role in the Strategic Balance
Within this maritime contest, India occupies a pivotal yet
asymmetrically dependent position. The U.S.-India strategic partnership,
formalized as a Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership, has deepened
through a series of defense agreements—Logistics Exchange Memorandum of
Agreement, Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement, and Basic
Exchange and Cooperation Agreement—and initiatives such as the Initiative on
Critical and Emerging Technology. Bilateral trade, approaching $212 billion in
2025, and joint exercises like Malabar underscore India’s role as a
counterweight to China, particularly in the Indian Ocean, where its navy is
poised to function as a net security provider. The recent 10-year Defense
Framework, signed in October 2025, further commits both nations to enhanced
interoperability and co-production, exemplified by the manufacture of GE F-414
jet engines in India.
However,
the partnership is characterized by a pronounced carrot-and-stick dynamic. The
United States offers significant incentives—defense sales, technology
transfers, and Quad cooperation—but wields economic leverage to enforce
alignment. Since July 2025, tariffs of 25 to 50 percent have been imposed on
key Indian exports, including textiles and pharmaceuticals, ostensibly to
address a $46 billion trade deficit and India’s continued purchase of Russian
oil, which constitutes nearly half of its energy imports. These measures,
coupled with heightened scrutiny of H-1B visas and potential invocation of the
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, reflect a transactional
approach that prioritizes American economic and strategic imperatives. As Indian
analyst C. Raja Mohan observes, “The United States wants India to be a
full-spectrum partner in containing China but is unwilling to accommodate New
Delhi’s strategic autonomy.”
This asymmetry stems from India’s reliance on the United
States for advanced defense technologies, access to critical markets, and
participation in global technology regimes, despite its growing economic and
military capabilities. The partnership, while strategically vital, is not the
unqualified alliance some Indian narratives suggest. Former Indian ambassador
M.K. Bhadrakumar has described it as “a relationship of convenience rather than
deep trust,” noting that “the United States has no hesitation in using economic
coercion to extract concessions.”
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Can
India's Situation Relative to the US Change in 10 Years? The dynamics
of the US-India relationship could significantly evolve by 2035, potentially
shifting India from a position of relative dependence—marked by US economic
leverage like tariffs and conditional tech transfers—to one of greater parity
or even mutual indispensability. This wouldn't mean India becoming a
"superpower" overnight or the US ceding dominance, but rather India
leveraging its projected economic and strategic rise to negotiate as a
co-equal partner rather than a "client state." Projections from
think tanks like the Hudson Institute and Brookings indicate India could
emerge as the world's third-largest economy (GDP ~$10 trillion nominal by
2035, up from ~$4 trillion in 2025), with a youthful workforce of ~1 billion
and leadership in sectors like IT, renewables, and space. This growth, if
sustained at 6-7% annually, would amplify India's global clout, reducing its
vulnerability to US "carrot-and-stick" tactics. However,
change isn't inevitable. Current frictions—US tariffs (25-50% on Indian
exports since July 2025), H-1B visa curbs, and penalties for Russian oil
imports—highlight India's asymmetry: a $46 billion trade surplus with the US
but heavy reliance on American markets for services (~$80 billion annually)
and defense tech. On X, analysts like @AchalG9 argue India "can't become
a 10T economy without good relations with US, China, Europe," but
emphasize it "will not bow down," reflecting a consensus that mutual
needs (US: China counterweight; India: tech access) prevent total rupture. By
2035, a multipolar world—with a tri-polar US-China-India structure—could
force the US to accommodate India's "strategic autonomy" more
fully, as decoupling would harm both (e.g., US supply chains reliant on
Indian semiconductors). The 10-year
US-India Defense Framework (2025-2035), signed in October 2025, signals
deepening ties in logistics and co-production, but it's framed as
"transactional" rather than trust-based, underscoring the need for
India to build leverage. If India sustains reforms, it could transition from
"useful partner" to "indispensable pole," echoing how
China's rise forced US recalibrations in the 2010s. What Needs
to Happen for a Change in Status? India's path
to parity hinges on "proactive strategic autonomy"—evolving from
non-alignment's passive hedging to active self-reliance and multi-alignment
that builds leverage without isolation. This requires domestic reforms,
diversified partnerships, and assertive diplomacy. Below is a framework of
key enablers, drawn from analyses by CFR, Heritage Foundation, and ORF:
These steps
align with expert calls for India to "walk the tightrope"—engaging
the US without vassalage, deterring China without war, and partnering Russia
without isolation. On X, @vakibs stresses "native manufacturing,
military complex, AI infra" as non-negotiables for multipolarity, while
@Z_DauletSingh notes India's "minimal dependence" gives it
resilience if reforms accelerate. Success depends on Modi's successors
prioritizing execution over rhetoric; failure risks prolonged asymmetry, as
@Ignis_Rex warns of a US Asia retreat leaving India exposed to China by 2050. In summary,
2035 could see India as a "stakeholder" shaping Indo-Pacific rules,
per Hudson, if it invests ~$1-2T in self-reliance. But as Foreign Affairs
notes, without this, US "sleepless nights" over China will still
prioritize containing Beijing over empowering Delhi. The window is
open—India's youth bulge and democracy provide tailwinds—but it demands bold,
sustained action. |
The Path to Strategic Parity
India’s capacity to alter this dynamic over the next decade
depends on achieving greater self-reliance across economic, military, and
technological domains. By 2035, sustained economic growth of 6 to 7 percent
annually could elevate India’s nominal GDP to approximately $10 trillion,
making it the world’s third-largest economy and reducing its vulnerability to
external economic pressures. Achieving this requires accelerating domestic
manufacturing under initiatives like Make in India, expanding the capacity to
produce 70 percent of defense requirements indigenously, and diversifying trade
partnerships through free trade agreements with the European Union, United
Kingdom, and United Arab Emirates. As ORF analyst Harsh V. Pant argues,
“India’s strategic autonomy is not merely a diplomatic posture but a necessity
that requires a robust domestic industrial base capable of reducing dependence
on external suppliers.”
Military modernization—particularly expanding the navy to
200 ships and developing credible power projection capabilities—is equally
critical. By establishing itself as the preeminent maritime power in the Indian
Ocean, India can compel greater deference from the United States, which relies
on Indian cooperation to secure sea lines of communication beyond the Malacca
Strait. Technological leadership in areas such as semiconductors, artificial
intelligence, and space further enhances this leverage. Initiatives like the
GlobalFoundries semiconductor facility in Kolkata and the NASA-ISRO NISAR
satellite mission demonstrate India’s potential to become a critical node in
global technology supply chains.
Diplomatic multi-alignment is another cornerstone. By
cultivating robust relationships with Russia, the European Union, and the
Global South while deepening cooperation within the Quad, India can maintain
the flexibility to pursue its interests without being subsumed into an
exclusively American orbit. As former National Security Advisor Shivshankar
Menon has noted, “India’s ability to navigate a multipolar world depends on its
capacity to engage multiple powers without becoming dependent on any single one.”
Settling the border dispute with China, even partially, would further enhance
India’s strategic freedom, allowing it to focus resources on maritime
capabilities and economic growth.
Reflection
The strategic interplay between the United States, China,
and India, viewed through the enduring lens of Mahan and Corbett, reveals the
persistent centrality of maritime power in shaping global order. Mahan’s
insistence on decisive fleet actions and institutional prerequisites for sea
power underscores the limitations of China’s maritime ambitions, despite its
formidable quantitative growth. Corbett’s emphasis on securing maritime
communications through distributed operations illuminates the United States’ current
strategy, which seeks to leverage alliances and dispersed basing to maintain
control of contested waters. Within this framework, India stands at a critical
juncture: its geographic position astride vital Indian Ocean sea lanes and its
growing economic potential make it indispensable to American strategic
calculations, yet its dependence on external technologies and markets leaves it
vulnerable to economic coercion.
Over the next decade, India’s trajectory will determine
whether it can transition from a useful partner to a co-equal stakeholder in
the Indo-Pacific. This transformation requires not merely economic growth but a
comprehensive reorientation toward self-reliance—building an indigenous
defense-industrial base, diversifying trade partnerships, and cultivating
technological autonomy. As the Hudson Institute’s Aparna Pande has argued,
“India’s rise as a great power depends on its ability to translate demographic
and economic potential into military and technological capacity.” Failure to do
so risks perpetuating a relationship defined by American leverage, while
success would compel the United States to accommodate India’s strategic
autonomy, recognizing that a multipolar order cannot be managed through
unilateral coercion.
The broader implications extend beyond bilateral dynamics.
In a world where maritime communications remain the foundation of economic and
military power, the ability to secure sea lines—whether through decisive
combat, distributed operations, or alliance networks—will continue to define
strategic outcomes. As the United States confronts the challenges of sustaining
its maritime primacy, and China grapples with the structural constraints of its
geography and institutions, India’s capacity to emerge as a self-reliant
maritime power will shape the balance of power in the most consequential
theater of the twenty-first century. The principles articulated by Mahan and
Corbett, far from being relics of a bygone era, remain the intellectual
scaffolding for understanding and navigating this enduring contest.
References:
Primary Sources:
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon
History, 1660–1783. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890.
Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.
London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911.
Secondary Sources:
Gray, Colin S. The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic
Advantage of Navies in War. New York: Free Press, 1992.
Holmes, James R., and Toshi Yoshihara. Chinese Naval
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Yoshihara, Toshi, and James R. Holmes. Red Star over the
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Press, 2010.
Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching
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Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Interest of America in Sea Power,
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Contemporary Policy and Analytical Sources:
Clark, Bryan. The Role of the Navy in Distributed Maritime
Operations. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
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Work, Robert O. "Multiple Dilemmas: How the Navy Can
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Goldrick, Jerry. "Mahans and Corbets: The Parallel
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India-Specific Sources:
Pant, Harsh V. Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First
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Pant, Harsh V., and Yogesh Joshi. India's Nuclear Policy.
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The United States and India: Partners in Defense, Partners
in Defense. Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense, June 2020.
U.S.-India Defense Framework Agreement. Washington, DC:
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United States-India Joint Strategic Vision Statement.
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India-U.S. Joint Statement: Elevating the Strategic
Partnership. New Delhi: Press Information Bureau, Government of India, January
25, 2015.
U.S.-India Leaders' Summit Joint Statement. Washington, DC:
The White House, June 26, 2016.
Analytical and Scholarly Works:
Kaplan, Robert D. Asia's Cauldron: The South China Sea and
the End of a Stable Pacific. New York: Random House, 2014.
Patalano, Alessio, and James A. Russell, eds. Maritime
Strategy and Continental Wars. London: Routledge, 2015.
Rubel, Robert C. "Navies and Economic Prosperity: The
New Logic of Sea Power." Corbett Paper No. 11, King's College London,
2012.
Germain, Eric. "Command of the Sea: The Corbett
Paradigm." Naval War College Review 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 101–119.
Strategic Studies Institute Publications:
Ladwig, Walter C., III. "Delicately Poised but
Potentially at War: South Asia and the India-Pakistan Composite Military Crisis
Stability Problem." Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic
Studies, National Defense University Press, 2015.
Tellis, Ashley J. "India's Strategic Choices: Between
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GAO, February 2022.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military
Balance 2023. London: Routledge, 2023.
U.S.-India Business Council. Strategic Partnership in
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