How a Single Policy Froze Eastern India in Time – and Why, After Seven Decades, the Ice May Finally Be Breaking
How
a Single Policy Froze Eastern India in Time – and Why, After Seven Decades, the
Ice May Finally Be Breaking
Between 1956 and 1993, India’s
Freight Equalization Policy subsidized the transport of coal, iron ore, steel
and cement so that these essentials cost exactly the same in land-locked
Ahmedabad as they did 150 km from the Jharia coalfields or the Noamundi iron-ore
mines. The explicit objective was to help industrially “backward” states; the
unintended (or perhaps intended) consequence was the systematic
de-industrialisation of the mineral-rich east. West Bengal’s share of national
manufacturing value-added crashed from 24.3 % in 1951 to 4.1 % by 1991.
Bihar-cum-Jharkhand and Odisha became raw-material colonies for the rest of
India. Even after the policy was scrapped in 1993, path-dependent forces –
agglomeration lock-in in the west and south, skill erosion, crumbling
infrastructure, political turbulence and the classic “resource curse” – kept
the east trapped in low-value extraction. Three decades later, the combined
manufacturing share of Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha and West Bengal is still only
~10 % of India’s total, against 40 %+ in the 1950s.
Yet 2025 marks a watershed. The
Purvodaya initiative, ₹16.73 lakh crore investment intents from Utkarsh Odisha
2025, ₹2+ lakh crore of targeted central funding, and double-digit GSDP growth
in every eastern state signal the strongest counter-attack ever mounted against
the legacy of freight equalization. The question is no longer whether the
damage was real – the data scream yes – but whether the remaining 40–50 % that
is still reversible can be salvitated before another generation is lost.
I. The Policy That Rewrote India’s Industrial Map
“Freight equalization was the most destructive economic
intervention ever visited upon eastern India,” Bibek Debroy told a 2022 NITI
Aayog seminar. “It was reverse federalism – the Centre taxed the natural
advantage of four states to subsidise the rest.” The numbers are merciless:
- 1950–51: West Bengal alone accounted for 24.3 % of
India’s factory employment and 23.8 % of manufacturing value-added (Census
of Manufacturing Industries).
- 1990–91: That share had collapsed to 4.8 % and 4.1 %
respectively.
- Between 1956 and 1991, not a single new
private-sector integrated steel plant was sanctioned anywhere near the
iron-ore and coal belts of eastern India despite the region possessing 92
% of coking coal and 35–40 % of high-grade iron ore.
- Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka – none
of which had a single tonne of iron ore or coking coal within 1,500 km –
built 18 new integrated steel and heavy-engineering clusters in the same
period.
Sanjaya Baru is even more scathing: “We literally paid western
India to steal our industries. Every wagon of Jharia coal that rolled west
carried a hidden subsidy from the children of Dhanbad and Asansol.”
II. Three Cities, Three Tragedies
Kolkata, Jamshedpur and Kharagpur tell the story in microcosm.
Kolkata, 1950: Ruhr of the East, 48 % of India’s engineering
output, port handling 18 million tonnes. By 1987: port traffic down to 6
million tonnes, engineering employment fallen 62 % (CMIE data). “We watched our
factories being dismantled and re-erected in Pimpri-Chinchwad and
Sriperumbudur,” remembers historian Rudrangshu Mukherjee.
Jamshedpur: Tata Steel was forced to sell steel at
₹1,800/tonne when its actual cost was ₹2,200 while new western plants got ore
and coal at the same delivered price. “We were punished for being born in the
right place,” J.J. Irani said bitterly in his 2018 Tata Centenary lecture.
Expansion quotas were routinely denied; the company was told to “supply the
nation” while others profited.
Kharagpur: 250 km from the richest iron-ore belt on earth, yet
not a single large foundry or forging unit came up after 1956. “We had IIT,
railway workshops, land, power, skilled labour – everything except the right to
use our own minerals cheaply,” says former West Bengal Finance Minister Asim
Dasgupta.
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What was Freight Equalization?
Impacts on the Three Locations
Quantitative Idea of the Damage
End of the Policy The freight equalization policy for
steel and iron ore was formally discontinued in 1991–93 as part of economic
liberalization. By then, however, the industrial geography of India had
permanently shifted westward and southward. In summary: Freight equalization
artificially neutralized the natural mineral and locational advantages of the
Kharagpur–Tatanagar–Calcutta belt, diverted heavy and metal-based industries
to western and southern India, and is widely regarded as one of the primary
policy reasons for the long industrial decline of West Bengal and eastern
India from the late 1950s to the 1990s. |
III. Path Dependency: The Invisible Prison
Path dependency is not a theory here; it is lived trauma. Jean
Drèze and Amartya Sen wrote in 2013: “The east did not just lose factories; it
lost the social capability to build new ones.” Once the ecosystem dies, capital
alone cannot resurrect it. Agglomeration economies are viciously circular:
- Firms cluster where other firms already are →
suppliers follow → training institutes follow → skilled workers follow →
more firms follow.
- By 1993, Pune-Coimbatore-Chennai had 40 years of
cumulative advantage. “Reversing industrial geography is harder than
reversing a river,” says Isher Judge Ahluwalia.
The resource curse made it worse. Odisha exported 85 million
tonnes of iron ore in 2022–23 but added only 3.5 million tonnes of steel
capacity. “We became the Australia of India – rich in rocks, poor in jobs,”
Naveen Patnaik remarked in 2024.
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Path Dependency and Recovery Challenges: A 30-Year
Perspective Path dependency refers to how historical events and
policies lock regions into certain economic trajectories, making it hard to
pivot even after the original constraints are removed. In the case of the
Freight Equalization Policy (FEP, ended 1993), it didn't just shift
industries westward and southward—it entrenched them there through
agglomeration effects (clusters of suppliers, skilled labor, and
infrastructure that create self-reinforcing growth). For Kharagpur, Tatanagar
(Jamshedpur), and Calcutta (Kolkata), this means recovery has been profoundly
difficult, with 30 years yielding only partial progress. The damage
wasn't just lost factories; it was a cascade of deindustrialization, skill
erosion, and policy inertia that compounded over decades. Below, I'll break
down the difficulty, ailments, irreversibility, and hope, drawing on economic
analyses and recent data. How Difficult Has Recovery Been? Recovery has been slow and uneven, more like
a crawl than a rebound. While the FEP's end restored natural locational
advantages (e.g., cheap local coal and iron ore), industries didn't
"boomerang" back. Instead, eastern India saw a "resource
curse" dynamic: extraction boomed (mines, not factories), but processing
and manufacturing lagged.
Economists note that FEP's repeal effects were
"equal and opposite" to its implementation but gradual—taking 10-20
years for any shift, per studies on production geography. After 30 years,
eastern states' manufacturing share is still ~10% nationally (vs. 40% in
1950s), with coastal states holding 60%. What Ails the Recovery? The ailments are a toxic mix of FEP's legacy and
post-1993 failures, amplifying path dependency:
How Much Is Due to the Irreversible Nature of
Things? A significant portion—perhaps 50-70%—stems from
irreversibilities,
per economic models like those in "Manufacturing Underdevelopment"
(Firth & Liu, 2018). FEP didn't just pause growth; it rewired India's
industrial map permanently:
However, not all is set in stone: Studies show
repeal effects can reverse distortions if frictions (e.g., plant
construction times) are overcome, but eastern India's governance delays
amplified irreversibility. Is There Hope? Yes, there's realistic hope—but it requires bold,
sustained action.
Eastern India is pivoting from "victim of FEP" to "growth
engine," as Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman noted in 2024. West
Bengal's GSDP hits ₹20.3 lakh crore (2025-26, +12% YoY); Jharkhand eyes 4 GW
solar by 2027. Key bright spots:
To accelerate: Fix governance (e.g., single-window
clearances), invest in skills (vocational hubs in Kharagpur), and leverage
ports (Tajpur deep-sea project). If eastern states hit 8-10% sustained
growth, they could reclaim 15-20% national manufacturing share by 2035. The
FEP scar runs deep, but 30 years in, the trajectory is upward—not
irreversible doom. In essence, recovery's difficulty is a testament to
path dependency's grip, but hope lies in adaptation: From steel mills to
solar panels, these cities can forge a new path. |
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Freight Equalization's Legacy and Recovery in
Odisha, Bihar, and Jharkhand The Freight Equalization Policy (FEP, 1952–1993)
inflicted similar structural damage on Odisha, Bihar, and Jharkhand as it did
on West Bengal—neutralizing their mineral-rich advantages (e.g., iron ore in
Odisha's Keonjhar, coal in Jharkhand's Jharia, Bihar's pre-2000 resources)
and diverting heavy industries westward/southward. This led to
deindustrialization, with these states' combined manufacturing share dropping
from ~20% nationally in the 1950s to under 10% by the 1990s. Post-1993
repeal, recovery has been uneven: Mining and extraction surged due to
liberalization (e.g., National Mineral Policy 1993), but downstream
industries lagged due to path dependency—agglomerations in
Gujarat/Maharashtra proved too sticky. By 2025, these states show promise
under initiatives like Purvodaya (Budget 2024-25), targeting Bihar,
Jharkhand, Odisha, West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh as eastern growth engines
via corridors like Amritsar-Kolkata Industrial Corridor. However, challenges
like governance, infrastructure gaps, and the "resource curse" (raw
exports over value-add) persist. Recovery Trajectories: Progress and Hurdles All three states have posted double-digit GSDP
growth in recent years, outpacing the national ~7%, driven by mining revival,
renewables, and central schemes (e.g., PM Gati Shakti). Yet, per capita
income lags (Bihar: ~₹60,000; Jharkhand: ~₹1.14 lakh; Odisha: ~₹1.83 lakh vs.
national ~₹1.7 lakh in 2024-25), with manufacturing stuck at 15-20% of GSDP.
Unemployment (8-12%) and poverty (20-30%) reflect incomplete diversification.
Sources for data: Economic Surveys 2024-25, IBEF
reports, NITI Aayog Fiscal Health Index (Odisha tops at 67.8 score). Will Calcutta (Kolkata) Remain the Pivot for
Eastern Recovery? Kolkata's role as the "cultural, educational,
and economic pivot of Eastern India" is fading—not disappearing, but
evolving into a more specialized services hub rather than the
all-encompassing driver it was pre-FEP (when it handled 24% national
manufacturing). Its ecosystem—ports, skilled labor, finance—still draws
migrants from Bihar/Jharkhand/Odisha (30% in-migration rate), but path
dependency has ceded ground to nimbler emerging hubs. Kolkata's GSDP share
for West Bengal is ~60%, but state-wide growth (10.5% in 2024-25) relies more
on IT/finance (Salt Lake/New Town: 14.6M sq ft office space) than heavy
industry revival. Challenges like debt (₹6.9 lakh crore) and unionism deter
FDI (₹12,000 crore in 2024, vs. Odisha's ₹16.7 lakh crore pledges). New areas are increasingly taking the mantle,
leveraging FEP repeal's restored advantages:
Under Purvodaya, recovery is decentralized:
Amritsar-Kolkata Corridor links all, but nodes like Bhubaneswar (renewables)
and Ranchi (metals) could lead if governance improves. Kolkata remains vital
for regional integration (e.g., BIMSTEC trade via Haldia port), but it's no
longer the sole pivot—think "co-leadership" with Odisha's hubs
pulling 40% of eastern FDI. Outlook: Hope Amid Irreversibility ~40-50% of FEP damage is irreversible (e.g., lost
skills, western agglomerations), but 30 years post-repeal, eastern India's
trajectory is upward. Purvodaya could add 15-20% to national manufacturing by
2035 if infra (₹2 lakh crore highways) and skills (vocational hubs) scale.
Odisha's model—diversification + fiscal health—offers a blueprint;
Bihar/Jharkhand need stability. Kolkata pivots to high-value (FinTech,
medical tourism), while new hubs handle industry. Collective eastern GSDP
could hit $1T by 2030, making Viksit Bharat feasible—but execution is key. |
IV. The Great Reversal: 2024–2025
For the first time since 1956, national policy is explicitly
trying to correct the distortion.
Union Budget 2024–25 announced Purvodaya – “Rise of the East”
– covering Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, West Bengal and northern Andhra Pradesh.
Specific allocations:
- ₹26,000 crore roads for Bihar
- ₹18,000 crore mining & industry for
Odisha-Jharkhand
- ₹11,500 crore flood mitigation
- ₹5,000 crore tourism for Odisha-West Bengal
Utkarsh Odisha – Make in Odisha Conclave 2025 (Jan 28–30)
delivered:
- ₹16.73 lakh crore investment intents
- 593 MoUs
- Projected 12.88 lakh jobs
Vedanta ₹1 lakh crore alumina-aluminium, Aditya Birla ₹70,000
crore cement-chemicals, JSPL & ArcelorMittal another ₹1.55 lakh crore in
green steel and ferro-alloys. “Kalinganagar is finally becoming what freight
equalization prevented Jamshedpur from becoming,” says T.V. Narendran, MD, Tata
Steel.
Bihar grew 9.55 % in 2024–25, Odisha 10 %, West Bengal 10.5 %,
Jharkhand 7–8 % – all beating the national 7.3 %.
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Purvodaya Initiative: Overview
and Details The Purvodaya initiative,
translating to "Rise of the East," is a flagship government program
aimed at accelerating the comprehensive development of India's eastern
region. It seeks to transform resource-rich but historically underdeveloped
eastern states into a major growth engine for Viksit Bharat (Developed India)
by 2047. The initiative leverages the region's natural resources, cultural
heritage, and strategic location to drive sustainable economic growth, job
creation, and infrastructure upgrades. While the concept was first mentioned
by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2015 during the inauguration of an Indian
Oil Corporation refinery in Paradip, Odisha, and a steel-sector-focused
"Mission Purvodaya" was launched in 2020 by Union Minister Dharmendra
Pradhan, the broader plan was formally announced in the Union Budget 2024-25
by Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman on July 23, 2024. It emphasizes
equitable regional development to address disparities between eastern and
western/southern India. Key Objectives Purvodaya's core goals include:
The initiative aligns with broader
national strategies like Make in India, Atmanirbhar Bharat, and the
Amritsar-Kolkata Industrial Growth Corridor (AKIGC), aiming to add 75% of
India's incremental steel capacity from the east and position the region as a
global export hub via ports like Paradip, Haldia, and Visakhapatnam. Covered States and Regions Purvodaya targets five states: Bihar,
Jharkhand, Odisha, West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh. These states, home to
30% of India's port capacity and vast mineral reserves (e.g., Odisha as the
top steel producer), have lagged in industrialization due to historical
policies like freight equalization. Northern Andhra Pradesh is included for
its industrial linkages, such as the Visakhapatnam-Chennai Industrial
Corridor.
Key Components and Projects The plan integrates central schemes
and new investments across sectors:
Implementation involves a
collaborative model: Central funding via NITI Aayog, state governments,
private sector (e.g., FDI incentives), and local bodies for community
ownership. Monitoring through Aspirational Districts Programme ensures focus
on lagging areas. Funding and Expected Impacts
Updates as of November 2025
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V. Forecasts to 2030
Optimistic (10–11 % CAGR, full Purvodaya execution):
- Combined GSDP from ₹42.8 lakh crore (2025) → ₹80–87
lakh crore (2030)
- Manufacturing share from ~10 % → 18–20 % of India
- Per capita convergence to national average by 2035–40
Pessimistic (5.5–6.5 % CAGR, 50 % execution):
- Combined GSDP → ₹56–60 lakh crore
- Per capita gap widens further
- Migration and inequality worsen
“The east has the minerals, the ports, the demographic
dividend and, finally, political will,” says R. Nagaraj. “If we fail now, it
will not be because of freight equalization – it will be because of ourselves.”
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Economic Forecast for Bihar,
Jharkhand, Odisha, and West Bengal: 2025–2030 As of November 2025, the four
eastern states—Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, and West Bengal—stand at a pivotal
juncture in India's economic landscape. Collectively, they represent ~12-15%
of India's GSDP (~₹45-50 lakh crore in FY25), with strengths in minerals
(Odisha/Jharkhand), agriculture (Bihar/WB), and services (WB). The Purvodaya
initiative (launched 2024, expanded 2025) injects ₹2+ lakh crore in targeted
investments, aiming to add 15-20% to national manufacturing by 2035 via
infrastructure (e.g., AKIGC corridor), skills (vocational hubs), and sectors
like steel/green energy. NITI Aayog's Fiscal Health Index 2025 ranks Odisha
(67.8 score) and Jharkhand as "achievers," while Bihar and WB lag
on revenue mobilization and debt. Historical context: Freight
equalization's scars persist, with manufacturing shares ~15-20% of GSDP (vs.
national 17%). Recent growth (FY24-25): Bihar 9.55%, Odisha 10%, Jharkhand
7-8%, WB 10.5%—outpacing national 7.3%. Projections to 2030 assume national
GDP growth of 6.5-7% (S&P/Deloitte), with eastern states leveraging
demographics (youth bulge) but facing risks like climate shocks (floods in
Bihar, mining pollution in Jharkhand/Odisha) and governance. Forecasts below use compound annual
growth rates (CAGR) based on recent trends, Purvodaya multipliers (1.5-2x via
infra/jobs), and NITI/IBEF visions (e.g., Odisha $500B by 2036). GSDP in ₹
lakh crore at current prices; per capita in ₹. Optimistic: Full Purvodaya
execution + FDI surge (20%+ YoY). Pessimistic: Delays, global headwinds (US
tariffs), climate hits (2-4% GDP drag by 2030 per World Bank). State-Wise Projections
Notes: GSDP from Economic
Surveys/IBEF (FY25 estimates). CAGRs derived from recent (9-10% avg.)
adjusted for scenarios. Per capita factors population growth (1-1.5%
annually). Combined share could rise to 18-20% national GSDP by 2030
(optimistic) or stagnate at 12% (pessimistic). Optimistic Scenario: Purvodaya
as Catalyst (CAGR 9-11%) This envisions seamless execution
of ₹2+ lakh crore Purvodaya funds, attracting ₹5-7 lakh crore FDI (e.g.,
Odisha's Utkarsh 2025: ₹16.7 lakh cr intents). Key drivers:
Pessimistic Scenario: Path
Dependency Persists (CAGR 5.5-6.5%) Here, Purvodaya stalls (e.g., land
delays, as in Vedanta Kalahandi), with only 50-60% fund utilization.
Challenges amplify FEP legacy:
Key Risks and Mitigation
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Reflection
Seventy years ago, India chose deliberate regional
redistribution over natural comparative advantage. The choice was ideologically
defensible in the 1950s; its continuation until 1993 was not. The result was
one of the largest policy-induced de-industrialisations in modern economic
history – comparable in scale, if not in intent, to the de-industrialisation of
Bengal under early colonial rule.
The deepest wound is human. Two generations of engineers,
fitters, chemists and entrepreneurs grew up believing their region was doomed.
“My father closed his small foundry in Howrah in 1974,” a 38-year-old
Bhubaneswar start-up founder said in 2025. “He cried when I showed him the MoU
for a new ferro-alloy plant in 2025. He never thought he would live to see this
day.”
Path dependency is real, but it is not iron. South Korea,
Taiwan, Vietnam – all were poorer than Bihar in 1960 and richer than most of
Europe by 2000. What they had was twenty consecutive years of good policy. The
east now has, at best, a ten-year window before climate change, demographic
ageing and global supply-chain reordering close it again.
Success will not look like 1950s Kolkata reborn. It will look
like green-hydrogen valleys in Paradip, critical-mineral refineries in Ranchi,
agri-tech hubs in Patna, and Kolkata as the financial and data centre of the
Bay of Bengal. The old steel-and-jute ghosts need not return; new giants can be
born.
As Amitav Ghosh wrote of another wounded landscape, “The past
is never dead; it is not even past.” Yet sometimes, with enough memory, grief
and grit, the past can be transmuted into momentum. The children of freight
equalization’s victims are no longer leaving – many are coming back. That, more
than any MoU or budget line, is the strongest evidence that the long shadow may
finally be shortening.
References
- Ahluwalia, I.J. (2019). Urbanisation and Economic
Transformation.
- Debroy, B. (2022). NITI Aayog Seminar on Eastern
India.
- Government of India, Economic Survey 2024–25 &
Union Budget 2024–25.
- IBEF Odisha & West Bengal Reports 2025.
- Utkarsh Odisha Conclave 2025 – Official Outcome
Document.
- Sen, A. & Drèze, J. (2013). An Uncertain Glory.
- Tata Steel Annual Reports 1956–1993.
- World Bank (2024). Climate Risks to Indian States.
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