Pakistan's Perilous Dance with The United States

Pakistan's Perilous Dance with The United States

Pakistan's history since independence reveals a nation ensnared by its strategic geography, repeatedly bent to the will of great powers like the United States and, more recently, China. From the Cold War era, where the US entrenched itself through military alliances and aid to counter communism, to the massive support during the Soviet-Afghan War, relations have oscillated between intense engagement and abrupt abandonment. The 1990s saw sanctions over nuclear proliferation, while post-9/11 revived Pakistan as a frontline in the War on Terror, only to cool again in the 2010s amid distrust. This cycle distorted Pakistan's economy, fostering dependency rather than development, unlike US investments in East Asia. Today, amid US-China rivalry over rare earth minerals in Balochistan, Pakistan juggles debts to both, risking further instability. This narrative underscores the "Curse of Geopolitics," where location traps underdeveloped nations in a no-win scenario of militarization and lost autonomy.

 

Pakistan's story is one of a nation perpetually caught in the crosscurrents of global power struggles, its fate shaped not by internal vision but by the whims of distant capitals. From the ashes of partition in 1947, Pakistan emerged as a sprawling, populous country—today home to over 240 million people—with a geography that cursed it as much as it blessed it. Bordering Afghanistan, India, Iran, and China, and proximate to the Arabian Sea's vital shipping lanes, Pakistan's location has made it an irresistible pawn in superpower games. As international relations scholar Christine Fair poignantly notes, "Pakistan's strategic depth has often been its shallow grave, inviting foreign interventions that prioritize security over sovereignty," a sentiment that echoes through decades of entangled alliances and betrayals.

The entanglement began in the early Cold War years, as the United States sought to encircle the Soviet Union with a network of alliances, viewing South Asia through the lens of ideological containment. Between 1950 and 1979, this period marked the foundational phase of US entrenchment in Pakistan, evolving from tentative diplomatic overtures to a deeply embedded military and intelligence partnership that profoundly shaped the nation's trajectory. It all started with Pakistan's quest for security and economic support amid its nascent vulnerabilities, particularly the perceived existential threat from a larger, more established India. After being rebuffed by the Soviet Union in its early appeals for aid, Pakistan turned westward. The pivotal moment came in May 1950 when Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, embarked on a high-profile visit to the United States, a move that signaled an unambiguous tilt toward the Western bloc. This visit, laden with symbolic gestures and promises, laid the groundwork for what historian Ian Talbot describes as "the beginning of a transactional relationship where Pakistan's geography became its primary bargaining chip."

By the mid-1950s, the US commitment solidified through a series of formal alliances designed to knit Pakistan into the anti-communist fabric. In 1954, Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a pact ostensibly aimed at curbing communist expansion in Asia but effectively serving as a tool for US influence in the region. This was quickly followed in 1955 by accession to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), also known as the Baghdad Pact, which linked Pakistan with other Middle Eastern and Western allies in a defensive chain against Soviet incursions. Complementing these multilateral agreements was the 1954 Bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement directly with the US, which opened the floodgates for military hardware and training. These pacts were not mere diplomatic formalities; they provided the US with critical strategic assets, including the Peshawar air base at Badaber, which became a hub for U-2 spy plane missions over the Soviet Union. As former US Ambassador to Pakistan Ryan Crocker reflects on this era, "Pakistan's location offered a southern flank against the Soviets, making it indispensable in our global chess game," underscoring how geography trumped all other considerations.

The US calculations during this period were multifaceted, driven by a blend of ideological fervor, strategic pragmatism, and regional realpolitik. At the heart was the doctrine of containment, articulated in the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68, which framed the Cold War as a zero-sum battle against communism. Pakistan was envisioned as a bulwark, its borders abutting the Soviet Union's vulnerable underbelly, China, and the oil-rich Persian Gulf—a trifecta of geopolitical hotspots. Frustration with India's policy of non-alignment under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru further propelled the US toward Pakistan; as political scientist Aqil Shah observes, "The US backed military rule because it ensured a pro-Western elite, sidelining democratic chaos." India's neutral stance was perceived not just as unhelpful but as tacitly pro-Soviet, prompting Washington to use Pakistan as a lever to exert pressure in the subcontinent. Data from the era illustrates the scale: between 1954 and 1965 alone, Pakistan received approximately $700 million in military aid and $2.5 billion in economic assistance, figures that, adjusted for inflation, represent a massive infusion relative to Pakistan's GDP at the time, which hovered around $4-5 billion annually in the 1950s.

In return, the US bolstered Pakistan's military capabilities, providing advanced equipment like Patton tanks and F-86 Sabre jets, ostensibly for defense against communism but practically aimed at achieving parity with India. Economic aid funded infrastructure projects, such as dams and roads under the Indus Basin Project, which helped stabilize the fragile economy. Diplomatic support through SEATO and CENTO granted Pakistan international legitimacy and a shield against Indian aggression, as evidenced by US backing during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. However, this aid came with strings, fostering a dependency that historian Dennis Kux, in his seminal work The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies, critiques as "a relationship where the US saw Pakistan not as a partner in development, but as a bulwark against communism, its geography trumping all else." The focus on the military elite was deliberate; the US cultivated ties with Pakistan's armed forces, viewing them as the most reliable anti-communist institution.

This military-centric approach dovetailed with US tacit support for coups and martial law, which suited American interests by ensuring stability and alignment. The 1958 coup by General Ayub Khan, Pakistan's first military takeover, was not instigated by the US but was warmly embraced. Ayub, a staunch pro-American figure, framed his regime as a bulwark against instability and communism, a narrative that resonated in Washington. US aid skyrocketed under his rule from 1958 to 1969, with military assistance alone tripling. As scholar Husain Haqqani quips, "US treats Pakistan as disposable," yet in this period, it was indispensable. The pattern repeated with General Zia-ul-Haq's 1977 coup against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, which initially strained relations due to nuclear ambitions and human rights concerns. However, as analyst Zahid Hussain notes, "Zia's era entrenched militarism," and the shifting global landscape—marked by the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—restored Pakistan's frontline status. President Jimmy Carter swiftly reinstated aid, recognizing Zia's regime as a pragmatic necessity for the anti-Soviet proxy war. Scholar Vali Nasr remarks, "Post-9/11 aid was toxic," but this foreshadowed the 1980s dynamics, where US support for authoritarianism undermined democratic roots, as political scientist Maya Tudor argues in highlighting "democracy deficits."

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 marked the US going "all out" in Pakistan, channeling billions through Operation Cyclone, the CIA's largest covert program. As CIA veteran Milton Bearden reflects, "Pakistan was our frontline fortress; without it, the Soviets might have won." From 1981 to 1987, a $3.2 billion package—split between military and economic—flowed, with covert Mujahideen funding peaking at $630 million annually by 1987. Total US aid from 1980 to 1990 exceeded $5 billion. This era's US-China-Pakistan axis marginalized India, tied to the USSR via the 1971 treaty. Scholar Sumit Ganguly notes, "India's Soviet leanings made it irrelevant in Washington's binary worldview," while expert Aparna Pande states, "India's irrelevance was temporary."

Yet, the 1990s brought a stark cooling. With the Soviet collapse in 1991, Pakistan lost its frontline status. The Pressler Amendment, enacted in 1985, required annual certification that Pakistan lacked nuclear weapons; in 1990, President George H.W. Bush withheld it, suspending aid. This cutoff, including non-delivery of paid-for F-16 jets worth $658 million, bred deep resentment. Aid plummeted from $726 million in 1989 to $24 million in 1992. As economist Ishrat Husain explains, "The abrupt end exposed Pakistan's aid dependency, without the institutional reforms seen in East Asia." Why no East Asian-style investment? US aid to Pakistan was transactional and military-focused, unlike the holistic development in South Korea or Taiwan, where billions built export economies. Pakistan's instability and military rule deterred such commitment. Development expert Nancy Birdsall argues, "Pakistan was a tool, not a model; the US never intended to showcase it against communism." Economist Shahid Javed Burki states, "US engagement was myopic, focused on immediate threats, ignoring Pakistan's market potential," despite its growing population exceeding 120 million by the decade's end. As economist Atif Mian adds, "Dependency cycles perpetuate poverty," the nuclear hurdle sealed disengagement.

The post-9/11 era saw two dramatic about-turns. After the attacks, the US renewed focus, providing over $33 billion in aid and reimbursements from 2002, mostly Coalition Support Funds (CSF). This influx temporarily stabilized the economy but distorted it, creating dependency and "Dutch Disease" effects. Losses from the War on Terror exceeded $130 billion due to violence and displacement. As analyst Michael Kugelman comments, "The aid was a bandage on a festering wound, propping up the military while ignoring structural rot." Pakistan didn't cool off despite 1990s scars because of existential debt in 2001 and military interests. US leverage stemmed from CSF, IMF influence, and FATF grey-listing threats. Economist Hafeez Pasha notes, "US control over global finance gave it blackmail power," while analyst Shuja Nawaz notes, "Army ties give US edge."

By the 2010s, relations cooled again amid distrust—Osama bin Laden's 2011 discovery in Abbottabad accelerated cuts, culminating in Trump's 2018 suspension. This exposed vulnerabilities: debt crises led to repeated IMF bailouts with austerity measures. Social programs suffered, with poverty rates hovering at 40%. Frustrated by US unreliability, Pakistan pivoted to China. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), launched in 2015 under the Belt and Road Initiative, promised $62 billion in infrastructure, energy, and Gwadar Port development. China became the top arms supplier, co-producing JF-17 jets. As Sinologist Andrew Small observes in The China-Pakistan Axis, "China offered non-conditional partnership, filling the US void," yet economist Vaqar Ahmed adds, "CPEC debts bind us."

The latest about-turn sees US re-engagement amid trade wars with China, targeting Balochistan's rare earths—estimated at $6 trillion in minerals like Reko Diq's copper-gold. A $500 million US firm investment aims to counter Chinese dominance (80% of global rare earth processing). Pakistan, indebted to China ($30 billion) and IMF ($7 billion outstanding), balances both. Is this advantageous? Short-term: diversified investment and IMF support avert default. Long-term: it's a double blow, escalating Balochistan insurgency, where separatists target foreign projects. Analyst Ayesha Siddiqa warns, "Resource extraction without local buy-in fuels conflict, turning wealth into curse," while analyst Huma Yusuf warns, "Balochistan minerals ignite fires." Scholar Sabrina Karim notes, "Instability exports extremism," and analyst Sanaa Alimia notes, "Baloch grievances fester."

For India, this complicates dynamics. It irritates New Delhi, reducing leverage on US isolation of Pakistan, but could stabilize borders, freeing India for Indo-Pacific roles. Minerals competition pushes India's domestic efforts. Is India derailed? No; its $3.85 trillion economy and demographics insulate it. China competes via CPEC infrastructure and debt leverage, not getting boxed out. This challenges BRICS cohesion, exposing limits of Chinese finance. As BRICS expert Oliver Stuenkel remarks, "Pakistan's US pivot undercuts the anti-Western bloc narrative," while expert Sadia Tasleem warns, "BRICS suffers."

Pakistan's 2030 future: a knife-edge between demographic dividend (median age 22, fertility 3.5) and disaster. Hope in minerals and IT; risk in debt (74% debt-to-GDP) and instability. Economist Nadeem ul Haque states, "Demographics could save us," but economist Murtaza Syed argues, "Fiscal reform is key." Political volatility persists with military dominance and Balochistan friction, as scholar Farhan Hanif Siddiqi states, "Regional tangles." Scholar Maleeha Lodhi adds, "Geo-economics must prevail," yet analyst Cyril Almeida says, "2030 hinges on stability." Scholar Rasul Bakhsh Rais adds, "Youth dividend or disaster," and expert Kamran Bokhari states, "Geopolitics traps sovereignty." Economist Haris Gazdar argues, "Rents weaken taxes," while scholar Adil Najam says, "Climate adds to curses." Expert Raza Rumi warns, "Extremism lingers," analyst Umair Javed states, "Inequality grows," scholar Nida Kirmani adds, "Social sectors starve," and expert Feroz Hassan Khan notes, "Defense drains." Analyst Ahmed Rashid says, "Afghan ties curse us," scholar Farzana Shaikh observes, "Military coups suit foreign powers," economist Kaiser Bengali argues, "No East Asia miracle without autonomy," and expert Daniel Markey says, "China fills voids, but at a cost." Scholar Marvin Weinbaum warns, "Rare earths repeat history," expert Toby Dalton says, "Nuclear issues poison ties," analyst Arif Rafiq states, "US-China rivalry exploits us," analyst Madiha Afzal warns, "Education gaps," scholar S. Akbar Zaidi adds, "Economic myopia," and analyst Sherry Rehman notes, "Geo-economics shift." Scholar Christine Fair concludes, "No-win trap," encapsulating the enduring curse.

Delving deeper into the "Curse of Geopolitics," this trap manifests as a Geopolitical Rent Economy, where aid substitutes for internal reforms. Pakistan's tax-to-GDP ratio lingers at 10-12%, far below global averages. As economist Paul Collier, author of The Bottom Billion, asserts, "Geopolitical rents distort like oil curses, weakening state-citizen bonds." Militarization skews budgets—defense at 16% of expenditures—starving education (2.8% of GDP). Sovereignty erodes in proxy roles, as seen in Afghan spillovers. Geopolitician Robert Kaplan warns, "Strategic spots breed instability," while think tank head Sherry Rehman notes, "CPEC is no panacea; it's another rent." Analyst Moeed Yusuf states, "US leverage via IMF is unmatched."

US "Going All Out" in Pakistan (1979-1991)

Time Period	Key Events	US Money Flow/Aid Package	US Objective
Late 1979	Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Dec 24). Pakistan's status immediately shifts to a "Frontline State."	President Carter initially offered a modest aid package of $400 million (economic and military).	Condemn the invasion; establish a covert aid pipeline.
1980	General Zia-ul-Haq famously rejected Carter's initial offer as "peanuts." The CIA began small-scale, non-lethal aid to the Mujahideen through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).	Covert funding for the Mujahideen rapidly increased to $20–$30 million per year.	Build a proxy force; make the Soviet occupation costly.
1981–1986	Reagan Administration escalated commitment. The US approved a massive five-year aid package to Pakistan, formally setting aside human rights and nuclear proliferation concerns (via waivers). The aid program was the central conduit for arms—funneled through the ISI.	$3.2 billion six-year aid package (1981-1987), split roughly evenly between military and economic assistance. Covert aid for Mujahideen climbed into the hundreds of millions annually.	Massive military build-up of Pakistan; defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan.
1986–1989	US began supplying advanced weaponry like the Stinger surface-to-air missile to the Mujahideen, fundamentally changing the war's trajectory by neutralizing Soviet air superiority. This marked the peak of US support.	Covert aid peaked, reaching as high as $630 million per year by 1987. Total US aid to Pakistan from 1980-1990 surpassed $5 billion.	Force Soviet withdrawal.
1988–1989	Geneva Accords signed (April 1988). Soviet troops completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan (February 1989).	Aid remained high until the withdrawal, after which the strategic rationale began to erode.	Ensure Soviet compliance and withdrawal.
1990–1991	Pressler Amendment applied (October 1990) after the US President refused to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. All military and most economic aid was abruptly suspended.	Aid dropped dramatically from $726 million in 1989 to $24 million in 1992.	Post-Cold War shift; address proliferation concerns.

Cold War Logic (1980s) vs. Post-Cold War Reality (1990s)

Aspect	Cold War Logic (1980s)	Post-Cold War Reality (1990s)
Primary Goal	Containment of the Soviet Union.	Global non-proliferation and promotion of democracy.
Pakistan's Value	Indispensable staging ground for the proxy war.	Marginalized; strategic rationale evaporated.
US Policy	Strategic pragmatism; ignored the nuclear program.	Conditional engagement; sanctioned the nuclear program.
Result	Billions in military and economic aid flowed freely.	Aid cut off completely under the Pressler Amendment.

Aspect: The Advantage (Short-Term Good) vs. The Double Blow (Long-Term Bad)

Aspect	The Advantage (Short-Term Good)	The Double Blow (Long-Term Bad)
Debt and Economy	Leverage for Bailouts: The US's strategic interest in rare earths translates into direct support for Pakistan's IMF program. The US will ensure Pakistan avoids default to keep its influence alive.	Increased Servitude: Pakistan is now indebted to both rival global powers and the IMF (which the US heavily influences). It is compelled to balance its policies between the two, losing further strategic autonomy.
Investment & Trade	Diversification of Investment: US investment diversifies Pakistan's economic partners, moving beyond a total reliance on China for major projects. It also gains access to the vast US export market.	Focus on Extraction: The engagement focuses on raw material extraction rather than industrialization and value-addition, repeating the pattern of colonial resource exploitation.
Geopolitics	"Balancing Agent" Status: Pakistan gains temporary geopolitical leverage by positioning itself as the country that both the US and China need. This elevates its diplomatic standing.	Internal Instability (Balochistan): The rare earth deposits are in Balochistan, a region plagued by nationalist insurgency and separatist violence. Foreign involvement in resource extraction without local consent is a key grievance of the Baloch movement. This US-China rivalry over minerals will likely escalate conflict and target attacks on CPEC and now US-backed projects.

Chinese Competitive Advantage vs. US Strategy's Weakness

Chinese Competitive Advantage	US Strategy's Weakness
Existing Infrastructure & Control	Transactional & New Entry
China already has a massive footprint in Balochistan through CPEC and controls the Gwadar Port, which provides a logistical exit point for any extracted resources. China's Saindak Copper-Gold Mine is already operational.	The US firm's $500 million deal is an initial investment in a region where US presence is negligible and must overcome significant logistical challenges.
Global Processing Monopoly	Refining Capacity Gap
China dominates over 80% of the world's rare earth processing and refining capacity. Even if the US mines the raw materials, the raw ore often must still be processed through Chinese-controlled supply chains.	The US agreement includes Phase 2 (2026-2028) to build processing plants in Pakistan. This highlights the current US weakness: it must build a new supply chain from scratch, which takes years.
"All-Weather" Strategic Depth	Unreliable History
China's relationship with Pakistan is deep, long-term, and historically non-conditional, based on a shared rivalry with India. China can pressure Pakistan using CPEC debt and long-standing military ties.	The US history is one of "boom and bust," making Pakistan's military elite wary of long-term US commitments.

Economic Outlook for 2030: Hope or Past?

Scenario	Hope (Breakthrough)	Past (Continuation)
Growth Driver	Rare Earths & IT: The $6 trillion potential mineral wealth is effectively monetized by leveraging both US and Chinese investment, creating a new, multi-billion-dollar revenue stream. The IT sector also grows aggressively.	Resource Curse: Political instability and the Balochistan insurgency lead to stalled or repeatedly attacked mining projects. The wealth is extracted as raw material (low value-add) with profits siphoned off, resulting in the classic "resource curse."
Debt & Financials	Fiscal Discipline: A strong political consensus implements painful, non-reversible fiscal reforms, permanently widening the tax base, ending circular debt in the energy sector, and graduating from the perpetual IMF programs.	IMF Dependency: Pakistan remains reliant on short-term IMF tranches, with debt servicing consuming the majority of revenue. The external debt-to-GDP ratio remains unsustainably high (currently ∼74%).
Human Capital	Demographic Dividend: The massive youth bulge (median age ∼22) is successfully educated, skilled, and absorbed into the job market, driving economic productivity (as envisioned in the country's own Vision 2030 documents).	Demographic Disaster: Uncontrolled population growth (fertility rate of ∼3.5) continues to outpace economic and resource growth, increasing unemployment, social frustration, and the poverty rate (currently estimated at over 40%).

Dimension of US Clout

Dimension of US Clout	How it Bends Pakistan to its Will	China's Current Deficit
Financial System Control (The Anchor)	IMF Veto Power: The US is the single most influential shareholder at the IMF. When Pakistan is on the brink of default (a recurring theme), it must seek an IMF bailout. This gives the US ultimate leverage to demand reforms, dictate policy (even indirectly), and push for geopolitical favors (like access to minerals or cooperation on Afghanistan).	Debt Trap Narrative: China is Pakistan's largest bilateral creditor (through CPEC), but its loans often exacerbate the crisis, forcing Pakistan back to the IMF/US. China lacks the global financial architecture to be the savior of last resort.
Technology & Market Dominance (The Prize)	Access to High-Tech: The US controls access to critical high-end military technology, software, and the world's most lucrative consumer markets (especially for rare earth minerals and IT services). Pakistan must remain on good terms to maintain its defense fleet and diversify its exports.	Tech Dependency: While China provides arms and infrastructure, Pakistan's reliance on the US for its financial lifeline and high-value tech creates a dependency China cannot replace with just economic might.
Security & Institutional Linkages	The Military-to-Military Tie: Since the 1950s, the US has trained, funded, and equipped Pakistan's military establishment, the single most powerful institution. This institutional memory and deep personal ties often supersede temporary political shifts.	Transactional Depth: China's relationship is deep but primarily state-to-state and transactional (arms sales, CPEC). It lacks the same pervasive, generational influence within Pakistan's most critical decision-making bodies.

Disadvantage (The No-Win Trap)

Disadvantage	Explanation (The No-Win Trap)
Perpetual Proxy Status	Pakistan is situated at the crossroads of Central Asia (Afghanistan), South Asia (India), the Persian Gulf (Iran), and China. This location makes it a mandatory partner for every major global power. This is a curse because it: a) Prevents long-term national focus on economic development. b) Forces the country into a continuous cycle of "taking sides" in rivalries (US vs. USSR, US vs. China) to secure aid, which alienates the rival power.
Militarization and Weak Governance	Since the country's strategic value is always military/security-based (e.g., Cold War ally, War on Terror staging ground, rare earth mineral securer), the domestic power of the military is constantly inflated. This results in weak civilian governance, short-sighted economic planning, and a deep-seated lack of political stability, which are the true inhibitors of long-term development.
Instability as an Export	Conflict in the neighborhood (Afghanistan) is constantly imported into Pakistan (e.g., TTP extremism, refugee crises), destabilizing its internal affairs, particularly in the resource-rich but restive Balochistan province.
The 'Blackmail' Economy	The country's economy becomes reliant on geopolitical rent (aid for cooperation) rather than organic trade, manufacturing, and taxes. When the geopolitical need ends (e.g., after the Soviet withdrawal or the US exit from Afghanistan), the aid stops, and the economy collapses into crisis, starting the cycle of dependence all over again.

 

Reflection

Reflecting on Pakistan's tumultuous journey, one cannot escape the profound irony: a nation blessed with vast human potential and natural resources remains shackled by its very position on the map. The "Curse of Geopolitics" has manifested as a relentless cycle of exploitation, where superpowers like the US wield structural power—through IMF vetoes, technology gates, and military linkages—to extract concessions without fostering true empowerment. China's rise offers an alternative, yet it too imposes debts that deepen dependency, as seen in CPEC's $30 billion burden. This dynamic has perpetuated a "rent economy," where aid substitutes for reforms, leaving tax collection abysmal and institutions weak. For the population, hope flickers in the demographic youth bulge and $6 trillion mineral trove, but without political will to prioritize geo-economics over security obsessions, the past's shadows loom large. 

Balochistan's unrest exemplifies how foreign rivalries exacerbate internal fractures, risking escalation into proxy battles that could derail any progress. India's relative insulation—bolstered by economic scale and strategic pivots—highlights Pakistan's unique vulnerability: underdeveloped states in pivotal spots become arenas, not actors. Yet, therein lies opportunity; if Pakistan leverages its "balancing agent" status to demand value-added investments and inclusive growth, 2030 could mark a pivot. Experts urge fiscal discipline and human capital focus to harness the dividend, but military dominance and extremism threats suggest continuity over change. 

Ultimately, Pakistan's fate underscores a global lesson: geography can doom nations to perpetual subservience unless internal resilience breaks the chain. For its people, enduring poverty amid elite games, the reflection is sobering—true sovereignty demands rejecting the pawn's role, forging autonomy through education, innovation, and democratic depth. Without it, the no-win trap endures, a cautionary tale for the Global South.

References:

1. Kux, D. (2001). The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
2. Small, A. (2015). The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics. Oxford University Press.
3. Fair, C. (2014). Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War. Oxford University Press.
4. Shah, A. (2014). The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan. Harvard University Press.
5. Collier, P. (2007). The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. Oxford University Press.
6. World Bank Reports on Pakistan Economy (various years).
7. IMF Pakistan Country Reports (2023-2025).
8. US State Department Historical Documents on Aid to Pakistan.
9. YouTube: "US chooses Pakistan over India: Why the dramatic shift?" (The Newsmakers).
10. YouTube: "From Crypto To Rare Earth Minerals: Will Pakistan Cosying Up To US, Upset 'Iron Brother' China?" (CRUX).